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Civil  conflicts  are  a  major  challenge  to  the  economic  development  of  a  country  and  its 
neighbors. The present article analyzes the consequences of conflicts on regional economic 
integration outcomes among African nations. Our findings document that civil conflicts affect 
the  economic  fate  of  regional  economic  communities  through  their  negative  substantial 
impact on business cycle synchronicity. Yet, contrary to the findings of previous studies on 
the effects of conflict on bilateral trade flows, we show that experiencing conflict increases 
regional trade intensities. This only holds in the short run and is explained by a decrease in the 
conflict country’s total trade and output, as well as by an increase in its intra-regional trade 
flows. By assessing the effect of conflict on regional economic integration processes, this 
paper  highlights  that  intrastate  political  events  are  also  a  major  regional  constraint.  We 
therefore  find  an  additional  reason  to  recommend  that  prevention  and  resolution  of  civil 
conflicts  might  be  put  on  the  top  of  the  political  agenda  of  African  Regional  Economic 
Communities. 
 
Keywords: Civil conflict, Regional Economic Integration, Regional Trade, Business Cycle 
Synchronization, Africa. 
 




1  Introduction 
Regional economic integration (REI) is crucial for African states since they are characterized 
by  relative  small  market  sizes impeding  their  development  process  and  integration  to  the 
global  economy.  The  potential  benefits  of  REI,  such  as  the  improvement  of  economic 
prospects and political stability, are expected to be substantial (e.g. Schiff and Winters 2003). 
However,  as  of  their  anticipated  outcomes,  the  existing  African  Regional  Economic 
Communities (RECs) have poorly performed since their establishment. Progresses in intra-
regional trade and policy coordination appear to be low. Among the identified explanatory 
factors, the lack of political commitment and the importance of economic constraints have 
been stressed as the most hampering for countries to progress in REI (Geda and Kibret 2008). 
As a major challenge to economic development, civil conflict might also be a constraint to 
REI. 
Africa is one of the continents that are the most affected by civil conflict, with more than 2/3 
of its 53 countries having experienced conflict between 1980 and 2005. Like all wars, civil 
conflict  has  harmful  consequences  in  the  occurring  countries.  Human  lives  are  lost  and 
communities, infrastructures and institutions are destroyed. Further, in terms of economic 
prospects, it has devastating consequences (Collier et al. 2003). Although civil conflict is an 
intrastate dispute, it is also found to have an impact on the neighboring countries by affecting 
their economic prospects (e.g. Murdoch and Sandler 2002), and by geographically spreading 
to those countries (e.g. Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Civil conflict is thus a source of regional 
political and economic destabilization and, as such, it might be an obstacle to progress in REI 
in Africa. Understanding the effect of conflict on REI outcomes would highlight the role of 




performances of African RECs. 
The  present  article  aims  at  assessing  the  consequences  of  conflicts  on  regional  economic 
integration outcomes among African countries. In particular, we are interested in analyzing 
what  happens  to  a  country  participating  in  a  given  REC  when  civil  conflict  occurs.  We 
therefore propose an empirical study of the regional costs of conflicts, in terms of their effects 
on integration outcomes in Africa between 1980 and 2005. The empirical approach we use in 
this paper is innovative for several reasons. First, we conduct the analysis at the multilateral 
level,  which  considers  the  degree  of  integration  of  a  country  with  all  the  other  countries 
belonging to the same REC. This allows us to account for the global effects of civil conflicts, 
rather than using the bilateral approach. Further, instead of de jure indicators of economic 
integration among nations such as the signature of agreements or treaties, we use de facto 
measures  accounting  for  the  various  dimensions  of  integration  which  are  the  increase  in 
regional trade and the greater economic interdependence between countries. In addition, we 
address  the  endogeneity  of  civil  conflict  relative  to  the  REI  measures  by  adopting  an 
instrumental variable technique. This allows us to control for the unobserved heterogeneity 
affecting simultaneously integration effectiveness and civil conflict, and purge the reverse 
causality between REI and conflict. The conflict variable is instrumented by the number of 
assassination attempts on national leaders and by the number of refugees hosted in countries.  
 
Our findings document that prevention and resolution of domestic violent conflicts should be 
put on the top of the political agenda of African RECs. We show that civil conflict reduces 
business cycle synchronicity and increases intra-regional trade intensities. We further find 




these results, we derive the following policy implication: it is highly advisable for members of 
the same REC to get involved in their peers’ conflicts prevention and/or resolution, because of 
their regional economic effect. Consolidating peace and building strong state institutions are 
crucial  to  improve  regional  economic  prospects  and  achieve  a  sustainable  economic 
development. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents theoretical aspects of the 
effect of civil conflict on regional economic integration process in Africa. Section 3 describes 
the  data  and  the  research  design.  The  results  are  discussed  in  section  4,  and  concluding 
remarks are provided in the final section. 
 
2  Civil Conflict and Regional Economic Integration: Theoretical Aspects  
 
2.1  Regional Economic Integration in Africa 
According to Balassa (1961), REI can be defined as a process by which a group of countries 
agrees “to eliminate discrimination between the economic and noneconomic units that belong 
to the different national states”. Various stages of REI can be distinguished, following Balassa 
(1961), from the establishment of a free trade area to a full economic union, according to the 
extent of cooperation: a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, a monetary union 
and a full economic union
3. REI has become a concern for all countries throughout the world, 
                                                 
3 A free trade area is a group of countries which suppresses all restrictions on mutual trade, but each member 




in  the  current  context  of  increased  globalization.  Indeed,  as  pointed  out  by  Alesina  and 
Spolaore  (1997),  “countries  that  are  too  small  may  not  be  viable  in  a  world  of  trade 
restrictions”. Most African states are characterized by a low income and a small market size 
(UNECA 2004). For them, REI is thus crucial. Regional integration is first viewed as means 
to allow African states to offset the small size of their domestic markets and attain sustained 
economic growth, notably through scale and competition effects, new trade opportunities and 
increased investment (Schiff and Winters 2003). It is also perceived as a possible way to 
improve the credibility of members’ economic policies (Fernandez and Portes 1998) and as an 
important tool for diplomacy (Schiff and Winters 1998). 
REI is not a straightforward process; it involves the decision to cooperate (de jure integration) 
and  the  effectiveness  of  the  cooperation  (de  facto  integration).  Neither  the  signature  of  a 
treaty, nor the establishment of regional institutions in charge of the execution of policies 
allowing  regional  economic  progress  guarantee  the  effectiveness  of  REI.  Countries  must 
implement  specific  political  and  economic  measures  in  order  to  achieve  the  gradual 
elimination  of  various  forms  of  discrimination  among  them.  The  set  of  such  measures 
comprises the continuing lowering of intra-regional boundaries and the shifting of authority 
over key areas of domestic regulation and policy to the supranational level (Lombaerde and 
Van Langenhove 2005). Without implementing those measures, countries would not achieve 
REI outcomes, in terms of increase in regional trade, in factor movement and business cycle 
                                                                                                                                                         
when countries adopt a common system of tariffs and quotas with respect to trade with third countries. Further, a 
customs union becomes a common market with the removal of all restrictions on factor movement. The adoption 
of a common monetary policy and a common currency leads to a monetary union, and beyond the monetary 




synchronicity. The increase in intra-regional trade would catch the progress and the reality in 
the  removal  of  trade  barriers  through  the  free  trade  area  and  customs  unions  agreements 
signed by countries (e.g. Carrère 2004 and 2006). In the same manner, the extent of cross-
border  shareholdings  and  labor  force  regional  movement  indicates  the  extent  of  the 
elimination of restrictions on factors movement. Further, the synchronicity of business cycles 
indicates the economic interdependence between the countries within a given cluster, and is 
required for countries to better coordinate their macroeconomic policies and reap the benefits 
of adopting a common market, common policies and a common currency (e.g. Mundell 1961, 
Frankel and Rose 1998, Darvas et al., 2005). 
Since the independences, African leaders have strived to enhance the economic integration of 
the continent. Several regional groups were created. We find that the number of RECs has 
increased from 10 to 21 between 1980 and 2005 (2 customs unions, 6 economic integration 
agreements,  8  free  trade  agreements,  3  monetary  zones  and  2  monetary  unions)
4.  The 
multiplication of RECs has been accompanied by an overlapping membership phenomenon. 
Out of the 53 African states, 46 are members of at least 2 RECs in 2004 (UNECA 2004). The 
average was only 1 in 1980. Overlapping membership hampers the progress of integration 
since  countries  participate  in  RECs  which  objectives  and  policies  that  are  different,  with 
however  a  global  emphasis  on  trade  and  macroeconomic  integration.  Despite  the  African 
interest in REI, the progress toward integration with respect to the achievement of these goals 
is  quite  poor.  For  illustration,  according  to  the  World  Trade  Organization,  intra-African 
exports represent only 9.5% of African total exports in 2007. Other blocs are performing 
better with 73.5% in Europe, 51.3% in North America, 49.7% in Asia, 24.4% in South and 
                                                 




Central America and 12.3% in Middle East. These poor performances hint poor effective 
implementation of regional agreements, suggesting that the issue of the difference between de 
jure integration and de facto integration is important in Africa. 
 
2.2  Constraints to progress in Regional Economic Integration in Africa 
 
Besides the REI outcomes we mentioned above, which are the benefits expected from the 
integration process, each step of the economic integration process also comprises costs for the 
members  of  a  REC  (e.g.  Venables  2000).  Such  costs  consist  for  instance  in  the  loss  of 
sovereignty over domestic policies, the diversion of trade and the loss of fiscal revenues from 
regional  trade.  The  distribution  of  costs  and  benefits  determines  national  interest  and 
incentives likely to lead countries to implement or not the regional agreements signed. The 
difficulty of bearing the costs associated with progress in terms of REI might explain the lack 
of political commitment of national leaders to put the regional agreements into action. Some 
requirements allow countries to offset the costs associated with a deeper degree of integration, 
at each step. For instance, the Mundell (1961) theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) 
provides the criteria required for countries in a monetary union to offset the costs associated 
with  being  in  such  a  union.  These  criteria  are  related  to  the  necessary  economic 
interdependence between the members of a same REC: symmetry in the shocks affecting the 
economies, full mobility of factors, diversification of production, similarity in inflation rates, 
flexibility of wages and prices, and capacity for risk-sharing within the REC. Thus, at each 
stage  of  REI,  if  the  members  do  not  sufficiently  fulfill  some  specific  criteria,  the  costs 
associated with the integration process might lead them to not make the efforts required for 




In Africa, as identified by Geda and Kibret (2008), the unwillingness of national leaders to 
effectively  implement  the  agreements  signed  is  a  major  political  constraint  to  the 
performances of African RECs. At the same time, it appears that the criteria allowing the 
countries to offset the costs associated with the integration process are not fulfilled, which 
hampers  the  suitability  of  regional  unions.  This  consists  in  the  economic  constraints  to 
progress in REI. Among those constraints, the overall insufficient production specialization, 
divergent  macroeconomic  policies,  poor  infrastructure  development  and  the  continuity  of 
strong  economic  ties  with  non-members  seem  to  play  an  important  role  (e.g.  Schiff  and 
Winters 2003 and Geda and Kibret 2008).  
Civil conflicts might be an additional constraint hampering the progress of African RECs. 
Indeed, Africa is one of the continents that are the most affected by civil conflict, with more 
than 2/3 of its 53 countries that experienced a civil conflict between 1980 and 2005. Only 17 
states have avoided internal sizeable conflicts in the continent
5, and on average, each year, 
civil conflict occurs in 11 African countries. Major challenge to the economic development, 
civil  conflicts  cause  serious  damages  to  national  economic  prospects.  The  most  common 
feature that has been identified in the literature on the consequences of civil conflicts is the 
decline of economic capabilities that results from civil conflict. A country confronted to a 
civil conflict might experience serious losses in its accumulated physical and human capital, 
and in its overall trade flows (Bayer and Rupert 2004). The impossibility for this country to 
offer secured long term returns for investments further results in a low investment (Collier 
                                                 
5 According to the UCDP/PRIO dataset, these countries are Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon,  Libya,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mauritania,  Mauritius,  Namibia,  Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  Seychelles, 




1999), which leads this country to a decline in GDP per capita and/or in growth rates. Not 
only do civil conflicts have an impact on economic capabilities when they occur, but also 
when there is a risk that they occur. Besley and Persson (2008) find that the risk of civil 
conflict results in a lower investment in state fiscal capacity, notably because of the diversion 
of fiscal resources in the increased military expenditures. Although intrastate events, it has 
been argued that civil conflicts have a strong negative impact on the neighboring countries 
(Collier et al. 2003). Murdoch and Sandler (2002) find that civil wars reduce short-run growth 
across an entire region of neighboring countries. De Groot (2009) moderates this finding by 
arguing  that  only  contiguous  (“primary”)  neighboring  countries  actually  suffer  from  the 
negative  effects  of  proximate  conflict,  and  also  experience  a  decline  in  their  economic 
capabilities. Non-contiguous (“secondary”) neighbors experience on the contrary a positive 
spillover effect. There is also some evidence that civil conflict may also have an impact on 
neighbors’ through geographical spillovers, which are considered as a strong determinant of 
civil conflict throughout the world
6. By allowing for country specific heterogeneity, Bosker 
and  de  Ree  (2009)  show  however  that  the  probability  of  civil  war  onset  following  a 
neighboring conflict is increased only for Africa. In other words, the fate of African countries 
does not only depend on their own actions to prevent civil war, but also on what is happening 
in their neighboring states. Thus, following the literature on their consequences, civil conflicts 
appear  to  be  likely  to  prevent  countries  from  reaping  REI  benefits,  notably  in  terms  of 
increase in regional trade and scope for better policy coordination. 
 
                                                 
6 See among others Sambanis (2001), Hegre and Sambanis (2006), Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006), Gleditsch 




2.3  Civil conflicts and REI: the transmission channels 
 
As a result of its impaired economic situation and lower investment in state fiscal capacity, 
we can expect a country confronted to a civil conflict not to be able to overcome the economic 
and political constraints to REI. Indeed, it might not be possible for this country to face the 
potential losses due to the REI process, notably due to the likely asymmetry in the shocks 
affecting  its  economy  and  its  regional  peers’  economies.  Further,  conflict  might  impede 
production diversification, infrastructure development within the occurring country, and make 
macroeconomic  discipline  impossible.  Besides  that,  conflict  might  affect  political 
commitment  towards  REI,  by  changing  the  priorities  of  the  governments  and  leading 
countries to become withdrawn. It is also likely that conflict countries might, for instance, be 
more sensitive to incentives to go back on signed agreements, given the time inconsistency 
problems of economic policy-making.  
As  of  intra-regional  trade,  the  effect  of  civil  conflicts  is  likely  to  be  ambiguous.  Indeed, 
besides the negative effect on overall trade due to the decline in economic capabilities and to 
infrastructure destruction, civil conflict might increase a country’s reliance on its regional 
peers. As Mansfield and Bronson (1997) point out, countries with limited resources might 
trade  more  with  their  allies  in  times  of  conflict.  Civil  conflict  might  then  contribute  to 
somewhat reduce economic ties with non-members. For instance, some countries consider 
certain ethical aspects when trading with other countries and might be unwilling to maintain 
economic relations with countries confronted to a civil conflict. Yet, in Africa, intra-regional 
trade  flows  are  weak  compared  to  trade  with  non-members,  mainly  because  of  the  non-




intra-regional trade flows due to an increased reliance on the members of the same REC, it is 
likely that this increase will not be large, compared to overall trade flows. Further, according 
to  Longo  and  Sekkat  (2001),  in  Africa  a  supposedly  large  part  of  intra-regional  trade  is 
unrecorded. Yet, it is likely that the part of intra-regional trade that is unrecorded will increase 
as a result of conflict. For this reason we expect civil conflict to have an ambiguous effect on 
intra-regional trade. 
In  terms  of  business  cycle  synchronicity,  which  represents  the  scope  for  better  policy 
coordination, civil conflicts are likely to have a negative effect. They might indeed lead to a 
greater economic divergence among the members of the same REC, first because they are a 
source  of  potential  regional  political  destabilization,  since  they  increase  the  neighbors’ 
probability  of  falling  in  their  turn  into  conflict.  Secondly,  conflicts  are  likely  to  reduce 
synchronicity  by  increasing  the  asymmetry  of  the  shocks  affecting  the  member  states 
economies, notably depending on if they are “primary” or “secondary” neighbors to conflict 
countries. Yet, if in a given REC there is more than one civil conflict occurring, then the 
neighboring  countries  might  be  “primary”  neighbors  in  some  cases,  and  “secondary” 
neighbors  in  other  cases.  Then  civil  conflict  could  be  a  covariate  shock  affecting  the 
economies in this REC. This might lead to a certain convergence within this REC, due to this 
covariate shock. 




3  Data and Research Design 
 
3.1  Data 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a panel data set that we construct from different sources. It 
covers the 53 African countries and the 21 RECs from 1980 to 2005. In this data set, the 
observation  unit  is  the  existing  couple  country-REC
7.  According  to  the  date  of  the 
establishment of RECs, we have a sample size of 3663 observations
8. 
As  mentioned  above,  the  integration  process  comprises  the  signature  of  treaties  and  the 
concrete measures taken to achieve free trade and common markets. Therefore, there is no 
guarantee that signature of a regional treaty would results in effective integration. On this 
aspect, one of the identified reasons of the poor performances of African RECs is the lack of 
political commitment in implementing the signed treaties. This leads us to rely on de facto 
measures of regional economic integration, to assess the effect of conflict on the effectiveness 
of REI, in terms of the expected outcomes of the implementation of regional agreements. In 
the present paper, we focus on trade relationships and the scope for coordination of policies, 
given the lack of reliable data on factor mobility for African countries.  We use the intra-
regional  trade  intensity  and  business  cycles  synchronicity  variables  as  proxies  of  REI 
outcomes, as suggested in the literature (e.g. Frankel and Rose 1997, 1998). 
                                                 
7 For example, the couples Sénégal-WAEMU and Madagascar-SADC are taken as observation units in our data 
set. 




For business cycle synchronicity, we rely on data on real gross domestic product (GDP) that 
comes from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) 2008. We take GDP as a 
proxy  of  real  economic  activity,  for  it  is  often  referred  to  as  one  of  the  main  summary 
indicators of economic activity, and because of its availability for African countries
9. We 
construct  the  business  cycle  synchronicity  variable  as  follows.  First  we  take  the  natural 
logarithm of GDP, and then we filter the data from short-term fluctuations and long-term 
trend to use the de-trended
10 component of GDP growth rate. In a third step, we compute, for 
each pair of countries, a correlation coefficient of the business cycles of countries i and j 
within the same REC over a rolling 5-years sub-period
11. Finally, we take the regional mean 
of  these  correlation  coefficients  for  each  country  i  as  our  measure  of  business  cycle 
synchronicity. According to the date of the establishment of the RECs, we have between one 
and twenty-six observations on the business cycle synchronicity for a given couple country-
region. The business cycle synchronicity variable, whose descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 1, is continuous and comprised between -0.720 and 0.758.  
                                                 
9 Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998), Darvas et al. (2005) and Inklaar et al. (2008), use alternative proxies of real 
economic  activity  such  as  the  industrial  production  or  the  employment  rate,  but  these  data  is  usually  not 
available for African states. 
10 Following Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998), the cyclical component is computed with the Hodrick and Prescott 
filter. We use value of 6.25 for the smoothing parameter, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual data. 
As also pointed out by studies by Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998) and Calderon et al. (2007), we find in our 
robustness checks that using different filtering methods does not affect the results,. 
11 For each year t, we compute the correlation coefficients on the period {t,t+4}, except for the year 2005, for 
which we compute the correlation coefficient on the {2005;2007} period because of data availability. We find 
similar  results,  available  upon  request,  when  we  compute  those  coefficients  over  different  rolling  periods’ 




The second dependent variable is intra-regional trade intensity. It is computed as the mean of 
bilateral trade intensities between country i and the other countries in the REC for each year. 
Following Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998), we define two indicators of trade intensity (TI1 
and TI2) as follows: 
) M (X ) M (X
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ijt X  is the nominal bilateral trade exports FOB (Free On Board) of country i to country j and 
ijt M  is the nominal bilateral trade imports CIF (Cost-Insurance-Freight) of country i from 
country j. Bilateral trade data come from the IMF database Direction of Trade. The official 
trade data are obtained from the compilation of formal trade and do not include informal trade 
which  is  certainly  important  among  African  states.  Therefore,  with  the  official  data,  the 
estimate  of  the  impact  of  civil  conflict  on  intra-regional  trade  intensity  may  be 
underestimated.  it X  ( it M ) is the total nominal exports FOB (total nominal imports CIF) of 
the  country  i.  it Y   is  the  nominal  GDP  of  the  country  i.  Total  exports,  total  imports  and 
nominal GDP are taken from World Development Indicators 2008. 
We are interested in investigating the  effect of conflict on REI. As our main variable of 
interest we use a dummy for the years during which a country is in civil conflict. We use the 
UCDP/PRIO  Armed  Conflict  Dataset,  version  4  (Gleditsch  et  al.  2002,  PRIO  2009). 
UCDP/PRIO defines a civil conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”. 
We control for the usual determinants of REI outcomes (Imbs 2004, Darvas et al. 2005 and 




production specialization is computed as the regional mean of the specialization indicator 
defined  by  Imbs  (2004) ijt S .  It  is  computed  as  the  mean  of  the  differences  of  economic 





njt nit ijt s s
T
1
S  , where 
ni s  denotes the GDP share of a sector n in a country i.  ijt S  reaches its maximal value when the 
two countries have no sector in common. The similarity of fiscal policies is proxied by the 
correlation of the share of government consumption in the GDP
12. The data for both variables 
is drawn from the WDI 2008. 
We also add variables that are included in gravity models. As suggested by Inklaar et al. 
(2008),  these  not  only  affect  trade  intensity,  but  there  also  related  to  variables  affecting 
business cycle synchronicity. These variables are the following: per capita GDP, to control for 
the effect of economic development level; an institution variable, namely the Polity2 variable 
from the Polity IV dataset; and the number of mobile and fix phone lines per 1000 inhabitants, 
to control for the level of infrastructures. The data is drawn from the WDI 2008. 
 
3.2  Econometric issues 
 
The focus of the present paper is the analysis of the potential effects of civil conflicts on  REI 
outcomes in Africa. For that purpose, we estimate the following regression:  
                                                 
12 The conventional deficit is usually acknowledged to be a better indicator of the fiscal policy of a government. 
We decided to use the share of government consumption because of the greater availability of these data. But 
when using the conventional deficit to construct the variable of similarity of fiscal policies as a robustness check, 




irt irt it irt η X γ Conflict β α REI + ⋅ + ⋅ + =                 (1) 
irt REI  is the regional integration indicator of a country i in a cluster r on year t,  it Conflict is 
the conflict status of a country i on year t,  irt X  denotes the various control variables that could 
determine REI outcomes independently of civil conflict and  irt η  is the classical error term. α, 
β and γ are the coefficients to be estimated. 
A simple OLS regression of equation (1) might yield biased estimates. There is indeed a 
potential issue with the reverse causality between civil conflict and REI. On one hand, civil 
conflict  might  make  more  difficult  the  integration  of  a  country,  and  on  the  other  hand, 
countries might get into an integration process in order to secure the achievement of peace 
and political stability. There is also a potential bias coming from omitted variable. Indeed, 
there are unobserved factors related to countries’ social, economic and political indicators, 
and/or to the incentives to implement the regional economic agreements. Those unobserved 
factors may affect both conflicts and the progress in REI. For instance, countries that are more 
likely to benefit from the distribution of gains and losses of REI might show a strong and 
sustained political commitment towards the integration process in order to capture the gains 
associated. In doing so, they experience an enhanced economic growth, which contributes to 
increase, for instance, the citizens’ opportunity cost of joining a rebellion
13. Then, the degree 
                                                 
13 Poverty has been identified as a cause of civil war by many studies in the literature. Yet, researchers differ in 
their interpretation of this empirical finding. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), conflict in poor countries 
reflects their henceforth limited state capability to put down rebellions, whereas for Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
it reflects lower opportunity costs of fighting in those countries. Whether one interpretation prevails on the other 




of REI will be closely tied to the fact those countries are in peace, and this could result in an 
observed negative association between regional integration depth and conflict status which 
might in fact capture the result of countries’ effective implementation of regional agreements.  
To purge the simultaneity between REI and conflict, and the correlations between conflict and 
unobserved factors affecting the effective implementation of regional agreements, we adopt 
an  instrumental  variables  estimator  and  use  two  instruments  for  conflict:  a  dummy  for 
assassination  attempts  on  the  national  leader  and  the  number  of  refugees  hosted  by  the 
country in each period.  
Jones and Olken (2008) analyze the effects of assassinations attempts on national leaders on 
political institutions and civil conflicts. In their study, they emphasize the role of national 
leaders in the path of conflicts and provide evidence that assassinations attempts affect civil 
conflicts  in  a  different  way  according  to  their  intensity.  While  successful  assassination 
attempts  lead  to  an  intensification  of  low  intensity  conflicts,  they  tend  to  hasten  the 
termination of high intensity conflicts. We use the data collected by the authors from 1875 to 
2004. They consider only the attempts in which a weapon was actually used. In Africa, there 
have been 13 assassination attempts among which 4 have been successful, between 1980 and 
2004.  This  is  the  key  to  our  identification  assumption:  if  all  assassinations  had  been 
successful, this variable could not be a good instrument, since Jones and Olken (2008) find 
that successful attempts lead to an institutional change likely to directly affect progress in 
                                                                                                                                                         
better economic policies, REI would allow states to make the require investments to increase national capability 
and change the political opportunity that affects rebels’ decision to fight. On the other hand, by enhancing 




REI. We assume that assassination attempts do not have a direct effect on regional economic 
integration, but an indirect effect through conflict, GDP and institutional change, for which 
we control. 
The second instrument we use for conflict is the number of refugees hosted by the country 
each year. We use data compiled by Marshall for the Center for Systemic Peace
14. Assisting 
and protecting refugees is a great burden for host countries, as suggested by the UNHCR 
reports.  Refugees’  flows  urge  the  necessity  to  provide  more  public  services,  increase  the 
scarcity of resources and require the shifting of a share of public expenditures from national 
citizens to the refugee  population. Refugees might  also influence positively the  country’s 
economic growth, if they have a high level of human or physical capital, or due to the increase 
in aid flows a host country might expect, especially when the conflict they are fleeing receives 
large international media coverage. We thus assume that it does not have a direct impact on 
progress  in  REI,  but  only  through  its  impact  on  national  economy.  On  the  other  hand, 
refugees hosting might, as argued by Saleyhan and Gleditsch (2006), lead to the international 
spread of conflict. First, refugee  camps  are often located near conflict  areas and targeted 
during attacks. Some of the refugees might also bring along with them arms, combatants, and 
ideologies which are conducive to violence and mobilize opposition directed at their country 
of origin, or even at the hosting country. Furthermore, Saleyhan and Gleditsch (2006) point 
out  that  there  might  be  tensions  between  refugees  and  host  communities,  due  to  several 
factors, from misperceptions about the real impact of refugees on the local environment and 
economy to the induced demographic and ethnic balance change in the host society. 
                                                 
14 Data compiled from the World Refugee Survey of the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 




We finally include in all estimates year fixed effects in order to control for the occurrence of 
covariate shocks, and region fixed effects to control for regional specific characteristics that 
are  constant  over  time,  notably  the  type  of  regional  integration  arrangements
15  or  the 
characteristics of the established regional institutions. 
 
4  Empirical Results 
 
4.1  Descriptive analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics on the full sample over the 26 years of our analysis are provided in 
Table  1.  The  average  country  in  our  sample  has  low  intra-regional  trade  flows  and  is 
relatively weakly synchronized with the countries in the REC it belongs to. In comparison, 
Tapsoba (2009) suggests that, from 1970 to 2003, the average business cycle synchronicity is 
nine  times  higher  for  the  OECD  members  (0.4012)  and  13  times  higher  for  European 
Monetary Union members (0.5554) than for African countries. This is consistent with the 
poor performances of African RECs we mentioned above. If we differentiate the variables 
according to the conflict status, we find that an average conflict country is not clearly more or 
less integrated than a country at peace in terms of business cycle synchronicity. In terms of 
intra-regional trade however, conflict countries are not clearly different as of trade intensity 
relative to regional partners’ total output, but they have  greater trade intensity relative to 
regional partners’ total trade. 
                                                 





4.2  Effects of civil conflict on progress in regional economic integration 
 
Table  1  shows  that,  on  average,  it  is  on  average  more  likely  for  a  conflict  country  to 
experience more assassination attempts on its leaders and host more refugees
16. The first stage 
equations  of  the  IV  estimates  are  reported  in  Appendix  3.  We  find  that  experiencing  an 
assassination attempt increases significantly the probability of conflict by between 20 and 31 
percentage points depending on the specifications, whereas a 1% increase in the number of 
refugees hosted increases also significantly this probability by between 3 and 5 percentage 
points.  
                                                 
16 We also conducted a test of the significance of the difference in the means of assassination attempts on leaders 
and refugees hosted according to the conflict status, which is not presented here but available upon request, 




Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables. 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  Observations 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
           
Conflict  0.21103  0.40809  0  1  3663 
           
Trade intensity           
TI1  0.00203  0.003313  0  0.03425  3452 
       With Conflict     0.00234     0.004212     0     0.03425     711 
       No Conflict     0.00195     0.003021     0     0.03425     2559 
TI2  0.00117  0.001753  0  0.02141  3532 
       With Conflict     0.00114     0.002067     0     0.02141     730 
       No Conflict     0.00116     0.001646     0     0.02141     2592 
           
Synchronicity           
Hodrick-Prescott (λ=6.25)  0.08053  0.19490  -0.72059  0.75819  3572 
       With Conflict     0.08044     0.20086     -0.56674     0.73156     753 
       No Conflict     0.08056     0.19331     -0.72059     0.75819     2819 
           
Instruments           
Assassination attempts on 
leaders  0.00792  0.08864  0  1  3663 
       With Conflict     0.02458     0.15494     0     1     773 
       No Conflict     0.00346     0.05873     0     1     2890 
Number of refugees hosted  68.2975  140.868  0  1527  3530 
       With Conflict     111.740     142.371     0     914     773 
       No Conflict     56.1170     138.037     0     1527     2757 
           
Note: Std. Dev. stands for Standard deviation. TI1= Regional average of bilateral trade divided by the sum of the total 
trade of countries in the pairs. TI2= Regional average of bilateral trade divided by the sum of the output of countries in the 
pairs. λ is the smoothing parameter of the Hodrick-Prescott’s filter.  
     
In  Table  2,  we  present  the  results  of  instrumental  variables  estimates.  We  find  that  civil 
conflict  significantly  affects  REI  process  through  its  negative  impact  on  regional 
synchronicity.  Moreover,  the  effect  is  substantial,  in  quantitative  terms.  In  column  [3]  of 
Table 2, we see that experiencing conflict reduces synchronicity by 0.126. If we compare a 
country at peace between 1980 and 2005 to a country having been in conflict on average for 




synchronicity measure would be -0.126*0.4081 = -0.0514. This amounts to slightly less than 
a  one-third  decrease  in  business  cycle  synchronicity  sample  standard  deviation  (0.195). 
Further,  comparing  a  country  at  peace  between  1980  and  2005,  such  as  Botswana,  to  a 
country which has been continuously in conflict over the period, like Sudan, yields a fall in 
synchronicity  of  0.126,  which  is  roughly  equivalent  to  a  two-third  shortfall  in  the 
synchronicity sample standard deviation. 
We find that civil conflict has a positive and significant impact on intra-regional regional 
trade  intensities.  If  we  compare  a  country  at  peace  between  1980  and  2005  to  a  country 
having  been  in  conflict  on  average  for  40.64%  of  the  period,  the  difference  in  the 
corresponding  intra-regional  trade  intensity  TI1  (TI2)  would  be  0.00143*0.4081 
(0.00093*0.4081) = 0.000583 (0.000379). This corresponds roughly to a one-fourth increase 
in both TI1 and TI2 sample standard deviations. This result might seem relatively striking, 
notably when considering the related literature. For instance, Bayer and Rupert (2004) find 
evidence that, between 1950 and 1992, civil wars have reduced total bilateral trade by about 
one-third. Besides that, given the identified impact of civil conflict on economic capabilities, 
we would expect a reduction in intra-regional trade intensity. Further, a major obstacle to the 
expansion of intra-REC trade in Africa is the similarity in the structure of trade among REC 
members  and  it  is  likely  that  conflict  might  hamper  the  diversification  of  the  economic 
structure,  not  only  for  conflict  countries,  but  also  for  their  neighbors
17.  Yet,  this  result 
indicates that civil conflict increases the ratio of the country’s intra-regional trade flows on all 
regional partners’ total trade flows: this can be due to a decrease in the conflict country’s total 
trade, as well as to an increase in its intra-regional trade flows. 
                                                 




Table 2: IV estimates of the impact of civil conflict on trade intensity and synchronicity. 
Dependent variable  Trade intensity  Synchronicity 
   TI1  TI2       
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Conflict  0.0014           
3***  0.00093***  -0.12641***  -0.13018*** 
  (0.00051)  (0.00033)  (0.04760)  (0.04714) 
TI1      0.26122   
      (2.45343)   
TI2        1.12234 
        (4.13336) 
Production specialization  -0.00096**  -0.00085***  -0.17958***  -0.17230*** 
  (0.00039)  (0.00026)  (0.03047)  (0.03033) 
Governments similarity  0.00077***  0.00041***  -0.00258  -0.00303 
  (0.00027)  (0.00014)  (0.02221)  (0.02222) 
Polity2  0.00001  0.00001  -0.00304***  -0.00310*** 
  (0.00001)  (0.00001)  (0.00088)  (0.00088) 
Log (Phone lines)  0.00034***  0.00021***  0.00997***  0.00963*** 
  (0.00003)  (0.00002)  (0.00284)  (0.00286) 
Log (GDP per capita )  0.00007  0.00012**  -0.01725**  -0.01741** 
  (0.00009)  (0.00006)  (0.00775)  (0.00770) 
         
Partial R2 of excluded instruments  0.0317  0.0319  0.0326  0.0334 
F test of excluded instruments  52.62***  52.92***  54.25***  56.07*** 
Hansen  1.257  0.117  0.598  0.578 
Probability  0.262  0.732  0.439  0.447 
Hausman test  12.74  14.77  5.738  6.289 
Probability  0.0004  0.0001  0.0166  0.0121 
Observations  2942  2946  2942  2946 
Note: All estimates include an intercept, regional and year dummies. TI1= Regional average of bilateral trade divided 
by the sum of the total trade of countries in the pairs. TI2= Regional average of bilateral trade divided by the sum of 
the output of countries in the pairs. The variables Production specialization and Governments similarity measure 
respectively the similarity of productive structures and the similarity of Government consumption with the other 
partners in a given cluster. The conflict variables are instrumented with a dummy for an assassination attempt on the 
leaders and the logarithm of the number of refugees hosted. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is the exogeneity 
of the covariate of interest. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 % and *** 
significant at 1 %. 
 
As we argue above, civil conflict might lead to an increase in regional trade, for the country 
having  to  rely  more  on  its  regional  peers.  But,  given  the  induced  decline  in  its  national 
economic capabilities and the spillover effects of conflict on its neighbors, likely to belong to 




Some of the control variables appear to be significantly associated to our measures of REI. 
Even if the  corresponding  coefficients  are prone to  an endogeneity bias, it is worthwhile 
briefly  comment  on  them.  The  results  indicate  that  the  similarity  in  the  production 
specialization of a country and its regional peers is negatively associated with REI. Similarly, 
infrastructure development (proxied by the number of mobile and fix phone lines per 1000 
inhabitants)  is  positively  correlated  with  REI.  Furthermore,  similarity  in  government 
consumption is positively correlated with our trade intensity measures, while institution level 
(Polity2) and GDP per capita growth are negatively correlated with the synchronicity variable. 
   
4.3  Delayed impact of civil conflict on REI 
 
The  effect  of  civil  conflict  may  vary  over  time.  Civil  conflict  damages  determinants  of 
economic prospects and induces lasting changes in the economic structure. We add the lagged 
conflict variable to our  regressors to test the assumption that there is a delayed effect of 
conflict on REI. The results presented in Table 3 show that civil conflicts do have a lagged 
negative effect on intra-regional trade intensities. Having experienced conflict the previous 
year  reduces  the  intra-regional  trade  intensities  by  about  a  one-third  sample  standard 
deviation, for both TI1 and TI2. This result is interesting if we put it in perspective with our 
above suggestion that conflict might have an ambiguous effect on intra-regional intensities 
due to the increased reliance of the conflict country on its regional peers. The lagged negative 
impact  of  civil  conflict  indicates  this  increased  reliance  would  be  a  relatively  short  term 
effect.  If  the  country  has  been  in  conflict  the  previous  year,  the  induced  changes  in  the 
economic structure lead to a decrease in intra-regional trade intensity likely to be due to the 




The negative effect of lagged conflict on intra-regional trade intensity might also be explained 
by the fact the regional peers experience an increase in their trade or output with other intra-
regional or extra-regional partners. In other terms, the regional peers would rely less on the 
conflict country. Yet, this lagged conflict-induced reduction in intra-regional trade intensity is 
not important enough to offset the current conflict-induced increase, the total effect of conflict 
remaining positive. For instance, having experienced conflict during both the previous and 
current  years  yields  an  increase  in  TI1  corresponding  to  about  one-sixth  sample  standard 
error, which is nevertheless a smaller effect than the one we found in Table 2.    
As of synchronicity, we find that if a country is in conflict the previous year, the difference in 
the corresponding synchronicity is equivalent to a one-fourth increase in the sample standard 
deviation. This result might be explained by civil conflicts negative effects on neighboring 
countries’  economic  prospects.  A  country  confronted  to  civil  conflict  might  show  greater 
business cycle synchronicity with the countries belonging to the same regional community, 
but this might reflect the fact that the regional peers also experience an impaired economic 
situation as a result of this conflict. The total effect of conflict is nevertheless still negative 
and significant; being in conflict during both the current and the previous years leads to a 
decline in synchronicity roughly equivalent to a one-fourth decrease in the sample standard 
deviation. The magnitude of this effect is less important than the one we found in the previous 
section, which suggests that the longer a country is in conflict, the less negative effect this has 
on its synchronicity with its regional peers. This is in favor of the assumption that conflict 
leads to a greater asymmetry in the economic shocks affecting the occurring country and its 
regional peers, asymmetry most likely due to the fact the longer a country is in conflict the 





Table 3: Dynamic impact of civil conflict on trade intensity and synchronicity (IV estimates). 
 Dependent variable  Trade intensity  Synchronicity 
   TI1  TI2       
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Conflict  0.00362***  0.00245***  -0.22487**  -0.23409** 
  (0.00119)  (0.00076)  (0.10030)  (0.09981) 
Lagged conflict  -0.00239***  -0.00165***  0.11705*  0.12259** 
  (0.00074)  (0.00047)  (0.06181)  (0.06149) 
TI1      1.80334   
      (2.57269)   
TI2        4.16910 
        (4.19652) 
Production specialization  -0.00114***  -0.00100***  -0.16175***  -0.15314*** 
  (0.00035)  (0.00022)  (0.03209)  (0.03207) 
Governments similarity  0.00082***  0.00045***  -0.00746  -0.00801 
  (0.00030)  (0.00015)  (0.02357)  (0.02359) 
Polity2  0.00001  0.00001  -0.00273***  -0.00280*** 
  (0.00001)  (0.00001)  (0.00090)  (0.00091) 
Log (Phone lines)  0.00033***  0.00020***  0.00963***  0.00920*** 
  (0.00003)  (0.00002)  (0.00312)  (0.00314) 
Log (GDP per capita)  0.00006  0.00011**  -0.01458**  -0.01492** 
  (0.00008)  (0.00005)  (0.00714)  (0.00715) 
Partial R2 of excluded instruments  0.0128  0.0128  0.0130  0.0132 
F test of excluded instruments  19.08***  19.13***  19.09***  19.49*** 
Hansen J statistic  0.191  18.33  1.225  5.212 
Probability  0.662  0.901  0.268  0.273 
Hausman test  15.07  0.0156  4.687  1.203 
Probability  0.0001  0.0000  0.0304  0.0224 
Observations  2770  2774  2770  2774 
 Note: All estimates include an intercept, regional and year dummies. TI1= Regional average of bilateral trade 
divided by the sum of the total trade of countries in the pairs. TI2= Regional average of bilateral trade divided 
by the sum of the output of countries in the pairs. The variables Production specialization and Governments 
similarity  measure  respectively  the  similarity  of  productive  structures  and  the  similarity  of  Government 
consumption with the other partners in a given cluster. The conflict variables are instrumented with a dummy 
for  an  assassination  attempt  on  the  leaders  and  the  logarithm  of  the  number  of  refugees  hosted.  The  null 
hypothesis  of  the  Hausman  test  is  the  exogeneity  of  the  covariate  of  interest.  Robust  standard  errors  in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 % and *** significant at 1 %. 
 




4.4  Robustness checks 
 
4.4.1  Calculation of the variables of interest 
Our results might be driven by the choices we made for the business cycles synchronicity, 
intra-regional trade and conflict variables. We first focus on the conflict variable and use the 
logarithm of the number of battle-related deaths, to assess the effect of conflict intensity, and 
the logarithm of the number of years of conflict
18, to assess its duration impact.  
The results, presented in Table 4, are similar to the ones we have with the conflict dummy 
variable, in the sense that the coefficient for synchronicity is negative and significant, and the 
one for intra-regional trade-intensity is positive and statistically significant. 
 
Table 4: Robustness checks on the effect of conflict on REI using alternative conflict variables 
Dependent variable  TI1  TI2  Synchronicity   
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Log (Battle-related deaths)  0.00020***  0.00013***  -0.01634**  -0.01696*** 
  (0.00007)  (0.00005)  (0.00662)  (0.00658) 
         
Log (Conflict duration in years)  0.00053***  0.00035***  -0.04842***  -0.04981*** 
  (0.00020)  (0.00013)  (0.01786)  (0.01766) 
All  estimates  include  the  following  variables:  similarity  of  productive  structures  and  of  government 
consumption with the regional peers, Polity2, Log (Phone lines), Log (GDPpc), intercept, regional and year 
dummies. Columns [3] and [4] respectively include TI1 and TI2 in the controls. TI1= Regional average of 
bilateral trade divided by the sum of the total trade of countries in the pairs. TI2= Regional average of bilateral 
trade divided by the sum of the output of countries in the pairs. The battle-deaths and conflict duration variables 
are instrumented with a dummy for assassination attempts on the leaders and the logarithm of the number of 
refugees hosted. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 % and *** 
significant at 1 %. 
 
 
                                                 
18 We use here the major dates of conflict, according to the UCDP/PRIO dataset. Yet, our estimates with 




For the business cycle synchronicity variable, the results might be different according to the 
indicator  of  economic  activity  and  to  the  filtering  method  used  to  compute  the  cyclical 
component of this economic activity. As indicator of economic activity, we could have chosen 
the consumer price index, which we did not because of the lesser availability of these data for 
African countries. Columns [1] and [2] of Table 5 show that our results do not significantly 
change when using alternative synchronicity variables. In column [3], we also have similar 
results when we use alternatives regional trade variables, except for TI3, the ratio of regional 
trade flows on total trade flows of the conflict country. To relate this with our discussion of 
the  results  shown  in  Table  2  for  TI1,  it  suggests  that  the  increase  of  intra-regional  trade 
intensity  relative  to  regional  partners’  total  trade  is  more  due  to  the  decrease  in  regional 
partners’ trade with the conflict country than to an increase of its reliance on its regional 




Table 5: Robustness checks on the effect of conflict on REI using alternative intra-regional 
trade and synchronicity variables 
Synchronicity variables   
  TI1  TI2 
   [1]  [2] 
Prices synchronicity  -0.10948**  -0.10969** 
  (0.05259)  (0.05232) 
Baxter-King Filter (2,8)  -0.14662***  -0.14882*** 
  (0.05076)  (0.04946) 
Fisher’s z-transformation  -0.13086***  -0.13473*** 
   (0.04981)  (0.04929) 
Trade variables  [3]    
TI3  0.00073   
  (0.00222)   
TI4  0.00227*   
  (0.00134)   
Log (Regional trade value)  1.61437***   
  (0.49268)   
Note: All estimates include the following variables: the similarity of productive structures and the similarity of 
Government consumption of the rest of partners in the given cluster, Polity2, Log (Phone lines), Log (GDPpc), 
intercept,  regional  and  year  dummies.  The  synchronicity  of  prices  is  computed  from  the  logarithm  of 
Consumer Prices Index. The Baxter-King filter assumes here that the length of business cycles is between 2 
and 8 years. TI1 = Regional average of bilateral trade divided by the sum of the total trade of countries in the 
pairs. TI2 = Regional average of bilateral trade divided by the sum of the output of countries in the pairs. TI3 = 
Regional average of bilateral trade divided by the sum of the total trade of country i. TI4 = Regional average of 
bilateral trade divided by the sum of the output of country i. Log (Regional trade value) = Sum of exports and 
imports to and from country i. The conflict dummy variable is instrumented with a dummy for assassination 
attempts  on  the  leaders  and  the  logarithm  of  the  number  of  refugees  hosted.  Robust  standard  errors  in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 % and *** significant at 1 %. 
 
4.4.2  Selection Bias 
Another issue that might modify our results is one of selection. In fact, there are two issues of 
selection. The observation unit in the dataset is the existing couple ‘’country-REC’’. Since we 
do not account for the non-existing couples, or the countries that are not members of any 
REC
19,  we  effectively  study  a  selective  sample  of  countries.  This  potentially  induces  a 
selection bias if the probability of becoming a member of a REC is related to the domestic 
political situation of a country. It may however be argued, that the bias is relatively small, 
                                                 




given  the  circumstances  of  the  construction  of  REC:  geographical  factors  and  cultural 
proximity usually play an important role in determining which countries join a REC (Frankel 
1997, Baier and Bergstrand 2004). Another issue of selection arises from the fact that there is 
non-random missing synchronicity and intra-regional trade intensity data. This is arguably 
more  important.  Indeed,  the  probability  of  having  missing  synchronization  and/or  intra-
regional  trade  data  might  be  systematically  higher  for  conflict  countries,  which  are  more 
likely to lack the capacity to collect reliable economic data. We can assume that a country 
lacking  the  capacities  to  collect  reliable  data  might  also  lack  the  capacity  to  implement 
regional economic agreements. Then, by not accounting for the existence of these missing 
data among the existing couples country-REC, we might underestimate the effect of civil 
conflict on effective REI. 
In  order  to  simultaneously  control  for  causes  of  selection  as  well  as  for  the  unobserved 
heterogeneity affecting both REC membership and agreements implementation, and for the 
simultaneity between civil conflict and REI, we adopt the method presented by Semykina and 
Wooldridge (2008). The method works as follows: in a first step, we estimate the probability 
of having non-missing synchronization or intra-regional trade data for an existing country-
REC couple and derive from this stage the inverse Mills ratio. Then,  we apply  a pooled 
instrumental variable estimator to the structural equation and include the estimated inverse 
Mills ratio in the regressions. Following Thomas and Strauss (1997), we use the same set of 
instruments to identify  both the selection and the REI  equation. The results, presented in 
Appendix 4, allow us to reject selection for the trade intensity regressions, since the inverse 
Mills ratio turns out to be statistically indistinguishable from zero. Yet, when introducing the 




indistinguishable from zero. For synchronicity, the estimated inverse Mills ratio is dropped 
due  to  collinearity,  for  it  is  constant  over  time,  which  means  the  process  of  selection  is 
constant over time. Then, by including region fixed effects allowing us to control for regional 
specific  characteristics  that  are  constant  over  time,  in  a  certain  way  we  correct  for  the 
potential selection problem due to the nature of our data. 
 
5  Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we have examined the impact of civil conflicts on REI outcomes in Africa 
through their effects on business cycle synchronicity and intra-regional trade intensity. In the 
literature on REI, these variables represent the progress made in terms of REI and the scope 
for going deeper into the integration process: the co-movement of business cycles catches the 
ability of countries to coordinate their economic policies and intra-regional trade intensity 
shows  the  economic  interdependence  between  countries  through  the  depth  of  their  trade 
relations.  Our  estimates  provide  evidence  that  conflict  in  a  country  tends  to  reduce  its 
synchronicity with its regional peers, whereas it increases its intra-regional trade intensities. 
We also find that while current conflict increases intra-regional trade intensity, lagged conflict 
reduces  it,  and  the  opposite  holds  for  business  cycle  synchronicity.  More  generally,  this 
highlights that progress in regional integration is modified once civil conflict occurs in one 
state. 
 




African countries have been involved in regional economic integration since the beginning of 
the twentieth century
20. The efforts made have varied across the different countries, regions 
and  time,  but  as  of  today,  the  performances  of  the  various  RECs  appear  relatively 
disappointing, especially compared to RECs in other developing regions. The recurrence of 
civil conflicts and other constraints related to political institutions raise the issue that the 
success of a REI process depends on if it is accompanied by a political integration process. 
The coordination of national economic policies particularly requires such a process. It is all 
the more essential for RECs’ members to strengthen their political ties when one of them is 
confronted to a civil conflict, for this will contribute to increase private actors’ confidence in 
the coherence of the initiative. Thus, by being committed to resolve a civil conflict occurring 
in a country, regional groups’ members might also reap specific benefits, in terms of their 
own progress in REI. We then recommend that, especially in the African context, RECs get 
strongly involved in their peers’ civil conflict prevention, containment and resolution. 
Our study also adds to the evidence provided by the literature on the effects of civil conflicts, 
by showing the negative regional effects of conflicts and identifying an additional incentive 
for conflict prevention and resolution policies. More specifically, our point here is that apart 
from conflict spillover effects that have been identified by previous studies, there is a further 
incentive for members of the same REC to work for the prevention and/or the resolution of 
conflicts in their peers. If conflict in a country impedes its progress in REI, then it should be a 
primary concern for its regional peers since their own progress towards integration would also 
be affected. We then argue that bringing a sustain political stability in a regional community 
                                                 
20 The East African Community (EAC) was launched in 1917, and the South African Customs Union (SACU) in 




should be considered as a regional public good and RECs’ members should get involved in 
the prevention, containment and resolution of conflict occurring in their regional peers. 
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Appendix 1: List of Regional Economic Communities and countries 
 
Clusters  Members  Type  Entry  Source 
CFA Zone (ZF) 
Cameroun (1961), Benin, Burkina Faso, Comoros, 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea 
(1985), Bissau Guinea (1997), Mali (1958-1962- 
1967), Madagascar (1973), Mauritania (1958-1973), 
Niger, Central African Republic, Senegal, Chad, 
Togo (1963) 
MC  1958  Authors 
Common Monetary 
Area (Zone Rand) 
Botswana (1961-1975), Lesotho (1961), Namibia 
(1990), South Africa (1961), Swaziland (1961)  MC  1961   
Liptako-Gourma 





Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, 




Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Niger, Sudan, 
Central African Republic (1999), Eritrea (1999), 
Djibouti (2000), Gambia (2000), Senegal (2000), 
Egypt (2001), Morocco (2001), Nigeria (2001), 
Somalia (2001), Tunisia (2001), Benin (2002), Togo 
(2002), Côte d'Ivoire (2004), Guinea-Bissau (2004), 
Liberia (2004), Ghana (2005), Sierra Leone (2005), 
Comoros (2007), Guinea (2007), Kenya (2008), 
Mauritania (2008), Sao Tome and Príncipe (2008) 
FTA  1998   
Nile Basin Initiative 
(NBI) 
Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, 




Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone  MC  2000   
Mano River Union 
(MRU)  Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea (1980)  EIA  1973  Frankel (1997) 
Economic 
Community of the 
Great Lakes 
Countries (CEPGL) 





Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda (withdraw in 2007), Sao 
Tome and Principe, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Chad 
FTA  1983   
Indian Ocean 
Commission (IOC) 
Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion, 
Mayotte, Seychelles  EIA  1984   
Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU)  Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia  FTA  1989   
Cross Border 
Initiative (CBI) 
Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
FTA  1993   
African Economic 




Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South, Africa, 








Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Bissau Guinea 
(1997), Mali (1958-1962- 1984), Mauritania (1958-
1973), Niger, Senegal, Togo (1963) 
MU  1958   
East African 
Community (EAC) 







1960   
Economic 
Community of West 
African States 
(ECOWAS) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde (1976), Côte 
d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania (1975-2000), Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 




Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(1997), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius 
(1995), Mozambique, Namibia (1990), Seychelles 
(1997-2004, 2008), South Africa (1994), Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
FTA  1992   




Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Djibouti, Egypt (1999), Eritrea (1994), Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia 
(1994-2004), Rwanda, Seychelles (2001), Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Libya 
(2006), Lesotho (1994-1997), Mozambique (1994-
1997), Tanzania (1994-2000) 
FTA  1994   






Cameroun (1961), Congo (1958), Gabon (1958), 
Republic of Central Africa (1958), Chad (1958), 
Equatorial Guinea (1985) 
MU  1958   
Note: PTA: Preferential Trade Agreement, FTA: Free Trade Area, CU: Customs Union, MU: Monetary Union, MC: 
Monetary Cooperation, EIA: Economic Integration Agreement, WTO: World Trade Organization. 




Appendix 2: List of countries in civil conflicts as defined in the PRIO data set (1980-
2005) 
Country  Period 
Algeria  1991-2005 
Angola  1980-2002, 2004 
Burkina Faso  1987 
Burundi  1991-1992, 1994-2005 
Cameroon  1984 
Central African Republic  1996-1997, 2001-2002 
Chad 
1980-1984, 1986-1987, 1989-1994, 
1997-2002, 2005 
Comoros  1989, 1997 
Congo, Democratic Republic  1996-2001 
Congo, Republic of  1993-1994, 1997-1999, 2002 
Côte d'Ivoire  2002-2004 
Djibouti  1991-1994, 1999 
Egypt  1993-1998 
Eritrea  1997, 1999, 2003 
Ethiopia  1980-1992, 1994-1996, 1994-2005 
Gambia  1981 
Ghana  1981, 1983 
Guinea  2000-2001 
Guinea-Bissau  1998-1999 
Kenya  1982 
Lesotho  1998 
Liberia  1980, 1989-1995, 2000-2003 
Mali  1990, 1994 
Morocco  1980-1989 
Mozambique  1980-1992 
Niger  1991-1992, 1994, 1996-1997 
Nigeria  2004 
Rwanda  1990-2002 
Senegal 
1990, 1992-1993, 1995, 1997-1998, 
2000-2001, 2003 
Sierra Leone  1991-2000 
Somalia  1982-1984, 1986-1996, 2001-2002 
South Africa  1980-1988 
Sudan  1983-2005 
Togo  1991 
Tunisia  1980 





Appendix 3: First stages of the IV estimates. 
  
                
Dependent variable  Conflict   
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
Assassination attempts 
on leaders  0.30816***  0.30626***  0.20842***  0.30841***  0.31347*** 
  (0.08886)  (0.08283)  (0.06616)  (0.07809)  (0.07711) 
Log (number of 
refugees hosted)  0.04724***  0.03793***  -0.00178  0.03881***  0.03919*** 
  (0.00361)  (0.00402)  (0.00534)  (0.00414)  (0.00413) 
TI1        -10.11045**   
        (4.02590)   
TI2          -24.90434*** 
          (6.54383) 
Production specialization    0.34799**  0.10403*  0.30216*  0.28517* 
    (0.15957)  (0.05820)  (0.16443)  (0.16596) 
Governments similarity    -0.07372  -0.03771  0.04580  0.05714 
    (0.09348)  (0.02635)  (0.09765)  (0.09839) 
Polity2    -0.00039  0.00031  -0.00440  -0.00444 
    (0.00341)  (0.00190)  (0.00378)  (0.00377) 
Log (Phone lines)    -0.01939  -0.03450**  -0.03586**  -0.03341** 
    (0.01643)  (0.01529)  (0.01700)  (0.01688) 
Log (GDPpc)    -0.12986***  -0.10997***  -0.13137***  -0.12979*** 
    (0.02022)  (0.02302)  (0.02130)  (0.02140) 
           
Observations  3530  3209  3209  2942  2946 
R-squared  0.163  0.210  0.540  0.232  0.234 
Note:  All  estimates  include  an  intercept,  regional  and  period  dummies.  Column  [3]:  the  estimate  also 
includes country dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 % 
and *** significant at 1 %.  





Appendix 4: Correction of selection bias in the IV estimates (Method of Semykina 
and Wooldridge 2008) 
Dependent variable  Trade intensity  Synchronicity 
   TI1  TI2    
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Conflict  0.00166  0.00000  -0.12641***  -0.13018*** 
  (0.00107)  (0.00010)  (0.04760)  (0.04714) 
TI1      0.26122   
      (2.45343)   
TI2        1.12234 
        (4.1334) 
Production specialization  -0.00100***  -0.00091***  -0.17958***  -0.17230*** 
  (0.00038)  (0.00026)  (0.03047)  (0.03033) 
Governments similarity  0.00077***  0.00037***  -0.00258  -0.00303 
  (0.00028)  (0.00013)  (0.02221)  (0.02222) 
Polity2  0.00001  -0.00000  -0.00304***  -0.00310*** 
  (0.00001)  (0.00000)  (0.00088)  (0.00088) 
Log (Phone lines)  0.00034***  0.00018***  0.00997***  0.00963*** 
  (0.00005)  (0.00002)  (0.00284)  (0.00286) 
Log (GDP)  0.00011  0.00004  -0.01725**  -0.01741** 
  (0.00011)  (0.00003)  (0.00775)  (0.00770) 
Inverse Mills ratio  0.00003  -0.01142***  Dropped  Dropped 
  (0.01295)  (0.00372)   
Partial R2 of excluded 
instruments  0.0103  0.2798  0.0326  0.0332 
F test of excluded instruments  18.60***  142.21***  54.25***  55.78*** 
Hansen J statistic  2.545  0.551  0.598  0.578 
Probability  0.111  0.458  0.439  0.447 
Hausman test  3.250  5.064  5.738  6.289 
Probability  0.0714  0.0244  0.0166  0.0121 
Observations  2942  2946  2942  2946 
Note: All estimates include an intercept, regional and year dummies. TI1= Regional average of bilateral trade 
divided by the sum of the total trade of countries in the pairs. TI2= Regional average of bilateral trade divided by 
the sum of the output of countries in the pairs. The variables Production specialization and Governments similarity 
measure respectively the similarity of productive structures and the similarity of Government consumption with the 
other partners in a given cluster. The conflict variable is instrumented with a dummy for assassination attempts of 
leaders  and  the  logarithm  of  the  number  of  refugees  hosted.  The  null  hypothesis  of  the  Hausman  test  is  the 
exogeneity of the covariate of interest. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is the validity of the instruments. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 % and *** significant at 1 %. 
 
 